We present an NP decision procedure for the formal analysis of protocols in presence of modular exponentiation with products allowed in exponents. The number of factors that may appear in the products is unlimited. We illustrate that our model is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the A-GDH.2 protocol suite. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003.
CITATION STYLE
Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., & Turuani, M. (2003). Deciding the security of protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and products in exponents. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2914, 124–135. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24597-1_11
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