Abstract
A fixed-pattern padding consists in concatenating to the message m a fixed pattern P. The RSA signature is then obtained by computing (P|m)d mod N where d is the private exponent and N the modulus. In Eurocrypt '97, Girault and Misarsky showed that the size of P must be at least half the size of N (in other words the parameter configurations |P| |N|/2. In this paper we show that the size of P must be at least two-thirds of the size of N, i.e. we show that |P| < 2|N|/3 is insecure. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001.
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CITATION STYLE
Brier, E., Clavier, C., Coron, J. S., & Naccache, D. (2001). Cryptanalysis of RSA signatures with fixed-pattern padding. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2139 LNCS, pp. 433–439). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_25
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