Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall and Restall’s book.
CITATION STYLE
Ferrari, F., & Orlandelli, E. (2021). Proof-theoretic pluralism. Synthese, 198, 4879–4903. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02217-6
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