Representation and Reality: On the Definition of Imaginative Prophecy in Avicenna

Abstract

The general issue of the relationship between Representation (and symbolic representation) and Reality—how, and to what extent, representations stand for and correspond to reality—has a privileged position in Arabic-Islamic philosophy: that of prophecy and of the veridical dream, which is both a sign and a mode of prophecy. It is in this respect that some remarks are offered here about visions and the doctrine of prophecy. After presenting the main elements of intellectual prophecy I discuss imaginative prophecy: this is related to something that is not universal and corresponds either to the knowledge (and expression) or just to the expression of a particular reality. Indeed, Avicenna uses imaginative prophecy to explain the prophet’s knowledge and representation of particular events—a knowledge which is possible because of a sort of conjunction between the prophet’s soul and the celestial spheres—but also the translation or conversion—into concrete and imaginative terms—of the intellectual truth the prophet’s intellect is capable of attaining. Thus visions in which imaginative prophecy is realized involve not only the first mode of imaginative prophecy (how the prophet foresees particular events), but also its second mode (how truth is expressed). In discussing this issue, I propose to interpret visions or prophetic representations as the result of the prophet’s capacity to receive and at the same time transform what is received. Finally, I briefly discuss the issue of visions and symbols: dream and prophecy imply a process of translation and interpretation, and then a transposition of sense. In fact, the ultimate meaning of prophetic representation resides in intelligible reality. The prophet, in his vision, is not dominated by his imagination (whereas the fool or the drunk is); his communication with the celestial, divine world is essentially intellectual (his soul is the rational human soul), but his language, the “symbols and indications” he uses (and must use) in representing his knowledge of the truth are those that are familiar (and comprehensible) to human beings, on whom the imaginative world exercises its suggestive power.