Bargaining-based cooperative game among multi-aggregators with overlapping consumers in incentive-based demand response

Abstract

To solve irreconcilable pricing strategies of multi-aggregators when overlapping consumers join in the incentive-based demand response programs, this study proposes a bargaining-based cooperative game among multi-aggregators with overlapping consumers. In the game, bargaining set is designed as an unbiased agreement which benefits all players in the game. Nash equilibrium (NE) of the proposed bargaining-based cooperative game is proved to exist uniquely, and the authors propose a hierarchical comparison algorithm to find the NE. In addition, the authors also propose a diverse compensation price (DCP) trading model between electric utility company (EUC) and demand response aggregators to save the cost of EUC and to improve the flexibility of trading. Simulation results not only verify the validity of the bargaining-based cooperative game and the hierarchical comparison algorithm but also testify the merits of DCP trading model in saving the compensation cost of EUC.