Impact of Asset Management Companies’ Exercise of Voting Rights on Corporate value

Abstract

This study examines the effects of asset management companies’ exercise of voting rights on corporate value. An analysis of 50,198 asset management company votes and 388,486 individual fund votes from 2013 to 2017 reveals that the company rejection rate of firm proposals in shareholder general meetings has more than doubled, from 1.47% in 2013 to 3.29% in 2017. The rejection rates of agendas such as dividend payout, M&A, and appointment of executives are relatively high, whereas the rejection rates of financial statement approval and executive compensation are low. An analysis of the market reaction to asset management companies’ exercise of rejection voting rights indicates that the firm’s stock price shows excess return on the day of the general meeting and that it continues to rise for the following five days. The rate of cumulative abnormal returns was also statistically significantly positive, especially in 2017. In terms of agendas, there is a positive market reaction to M&A and appointment of executives but a negative reaction to dividend payouts. This paper also finds that foreign or non-chaebol-affiliated asset management companies further exercise the opposite voting right on proposals, resulting in more positive market reactions.