The methodology of critical rationalism is constituted by a set of rules, which Popper first formulated in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Logic) and supplemented in later works. They state, for example, that scientific hypotheses should be severely tested, that they should never be regarded as finally verified, that we should not apply conventionalist stratagems, etc. In this paper, I want to discuss some problems connected with methodological rules, especially, questions concerning the status and function of such rules, and their relation to the aim of science. Many questions of this kind are still quite controversial, even among people who consider themselves as followers of Karl Popper. For instance, does science need principles about the believing or acceptance of hypotheses? Do the rules of falsificationism lead us to truth, or to progress? Can such an assumption be critically assessed and justified? © 2006 Springer.
CITATION STYLE
Gadenne, V. (2006). Methodological rules, rationality, and truth. In Rationality and Reality (pp. 97–107). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4207-8_6
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