Phenomenological Reduction and Methodological Abstraction

Abstract

Methodological abstractions, according to Thomas Seebohm, set up as a residuum the region of objects for a given science. The phenomenological reduction can be regarded as an abstraction whose residuum is the sum total of possible intentional objects as correlates of consciousness. Whereas a methodological abstraction in the broad sense of a phenomenological epistemology is concerned with all intentional acts and the evidence in which their objects are given, a methodological abstraction in a narrow sense deals with the methodology and objects of specific empirical sciences. Within the narrow sense, a first abstraction determines the ontological region of natural sciences by excluding all concerns except a theoretical interest. A further abstraction determines the region of the hard sciences and amounts to an abstractive reduction when the attempt is made to explain on this basis phenomena relevant to other sciences. As regards the phenomenological reduction, Seebohm analyzes the role of the egological and primordial reductions and highlights the genetic foundation of intersubjectivity within the structures of the primordial sphere. These structures include understanding whose basic form is a bodily understanding that functions as the genetic foundation for the elementary understanding of practical life, the first-order creative higher understanding inherent to cultural formations, and the second-order higher understanding provided by the interpretation of human sciences. A methodological abstraction determines the region of human sciences by bracketing practical moments of the lifeworld given in previous modes of understanding. After setting forth this overall framework, the article shows how elementary understanding plays a role in the generative foundation of the concepts both of natural and human sciences. Secondly, it examines the epistemic interpretation of the phenomenological reduction advocated by Seebohm in contrast to an ontic interpretation which is deemed irrelevant for a phenomenological epistemology. Finally, the article attempts to show that there is more to this elucidation if a deeper consideration is given to the pre-ego. It is argued that the epistemic interpretation and the ontic interpretation leave room for one another and even condition each other.