For two parties to communicate securely over an insecure channel, they must be able to authenticate one another and establish a common session key. We propose a new secure one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol which is well suited to one-way communication channels. The protocol is examined using an extension of the Bellare-Rogaway model proposed by Blake-Wilson et. al., and is shown to be provably secure, in the sense that defeating the protocol is equivalent to solving a CDH problem. We compare our protocol to existing approaches, in terms of security and efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only one-pass protocol that resists general key-compromise impersonation attacks, and avoids certain vulnerabilities to loss of information attacks found in other protocols of its class. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Chalkias, K., Halkidis, S. T., Hristu-Varsakelis, D., Stephanides, G., & Alexiadis, A. (2008). A provably secure one-pass two-party key establishment protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4990 LNCS, pp. 108–122). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79499-8_10
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