The United Nations’ change in approach to resolving the western Sahara conflict since the turn of the twenty-first century

Abstract

This chapter highlights the difficulties encountered by the United Nations (UN) when trying to overcome the obstacles placed by the two parties to the dispute over Western Sahara-Morocco and the Polisario Front-in the implementation of the original 1991 UN Settlement Plan intended to result in a self-determination referendum. It explains why in February 2000, when it was clear that compiling a list of potential voters acceptable to both parties was impossible, the UN was compelled to change its approach to resolving the conflict to exploring a political solution to the dispute through direct talks with the two parties. The chapter discusses the difficulties encountered by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum on Western Sahara (MINURSO) and Personal Envoy James A. Baker when trying to move the parties toward the self-determination referendum and describes how, failing that, “political solutions” were subsequently put forward such as the 2003 Baker Plan II, which was rejected by Morocco. After discussing how the UN has dealt with the conflict since Baker’s resignation in 2004, the chapter makes suggestions as to how the Secretariat and Security Council could try to resolve the conflict.