Contradictions and Rationality: An Analysis of Two Biblical Cases

Abstract

In this chapter, I want to read particular biblical cases as a means for examining two philosophical problems; namely, how to deal logically with contradictions and the consequences that follow from the alternatives examined regarding the notion of rationality. Considering a perspective according to which rationality is closely connected to a certain idea of logicity, my aim is to show that, on the one hand, in the story of Susanna and the Elders, Daniel’s belief in Susanna’s chastity can be understood as supported by a reasoning that is grounded on classical logic and thus fits perfectly into the classical model of rationality. The narrations of Jesus’s resurrection on the other hand would require a different approach both to contradictions and to the relationship between contradictions and rationality. Otherwise, there is a risk of either shaking up important parts of the Christian creed—such as the idea that God has a salvific plan that is made possible precisely by the resurrection of Jesus—or accepting that believing in the resurrection is irrational. It is worthy to take into account that, for fideists, accepting a religious belief as irrational is no problem because they hold that religious beliefs are a question of faith, and faith is either independent of or adversarial toward reason in the sense that it is not founded, nor can it be founded, on arguments. Something different happens with those who adhere to more rationalistic traditions like natural theology, which attempts to give a rational support to the belief of the existence of God. The Christian believer to which I refer in this work stands on the latter, more rationalistic side. With regard to the rationality of the belief in the resurrection, I contend that in order to be considered rational, one who believes in the resurrection could support that belief with a reasoning grounded on some form of paraconsistent logic. I focus here on da Costa’s C1 system and on the LFI1 system of Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo, but other paraconsistent systems could also be used. In the last section of the chapter, I present some problems that emerge when a perspective like the one proposed here is adopted.