We present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable election scheme Prêt àVoter [CRS05]. Firstly, we propose a mechanism for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identified in [RP05]. The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advantages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z*p space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if necessary. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Ryan, P. Y. A., & Schneider, S. A. (2006). Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4189 LNCS, pp. 313–326). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11863908_20
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