In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Bulygin, S., & Buchmann, J. (2011). Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7092 LNCS, pp. 54–75). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_6
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