The perspectivist conception of science

Abstract

The paper compares Evandro Agazzi’s “Gestalt view” with the Perspectivist conception of science developed by the author. What Agazzi means by Gestalt or “point of view”, as well as what the author means by “perspective”, is not something of the subjective sort. It is rather a particular way of conceiving of reality—a way that can be shared. Agazzi’s Gestalt view, however, differs in certain respects from the Perspectivist conception. First, on the Gestalt view, since theories concretely express their Gestalt in declarative sentences, the theories themselves must be true or false; on the Perspectivist view, the paradigm of a scientific thought would not be a true-or-false statement, but a more or less applicable concept. Second, Agazzi’s legitimation of truth on the Gestalt view entails realism, while Perspectivism is neutral as regards the empiricism/realism issue. Finally, some differences between both conceptions of science are mentioned as far as the solution of the incommensurability problem is concerned.