Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile phone blackout and counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region

Abstract

In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military, as part of its counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram insurgents, shut down GSM mobile telephony in three northeast states – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. This article explores the rationale, impact and citizens’ opinion of the mobile phone blackout. It draws on focus group discussions with local opinion leaders and in-depth personal interviews with military and security insiders, as well as data of Boko Haram incidences before, during and after the blackout from military sources and conflict databases. It argues that, although the mobile phone shutdown was ‘successful’ from a military-tactical point of view, it angered citizens and engendered negative opinions toward the state and new emergency policies. While citizens developed various coping and circumventing strategies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network model of insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its operations to the Sambisa Forest. This fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict. The shutdown demonstrated, among others, that while ICTs serve various desirable purposes for developing states, they will be jettisoned when their use challenges the state’s legitimacy and raison d'être, but not without consequences.