Managerial remuneration and payout policy: Evidence from Indian regular payers

Abstract

This study attempts to examine the role of managers in the associated agency theory on dividend policy decisions for firms that do not skip dividend payments. This research sample considered the firms that are listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and pay regular dividends on an annual basis from the financial year 2011 to 2020. Panel data econometric tools and robustness tests were carried out for model validation. The study results show that there is a higher positive relationship between change in payout ratio and managerial remuneration. Similarly, there is a large positive significance to increase manager incentive for regular payer firms with greater promoter control in higher dividend payout. Thus, this brings an agency theory perspective of rewarding well to managers to increase promoter wealth. Hence, policymakers can contemplate these findings to analyze the nexus between managers and promoters in the dividend policy of firms that never skip their dividend payments.