Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities

Abstract

The US military was conditioned by decades of preparation for conventional interstate war, as well as by its searing experiences in Vietnam and Beirut.1 Emerging threats to American interests posed by ethnic and tribal rivalries, religious zealotry, transnational terrorism, and illegitimate or brutal governments were seen as nuisances, and humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and "nation-building" were considered as "lesser included" missions.2 This tunnel vision prevented defense planners from recognizing the US military's vulnerabilities against potential adversaries who could threaten American interests asymmetrically with irregular forces. In his seminal work on American military strategy, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Russell Weigley characterized the traditional American strategy as one focused on a strategy of annihilation of the enemy.6 He attributed the development of this approach to America's great wealth, extensive resources, and unlimited aims, which together allowed American forces to rely on mass, firepower, and overwhelming force against its enemies.