Maoism in the cultural revolution: A political religion?

Abstract

The cult of personality surrounding Mao Zedong peaked during the initial phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR, 1966-1969). China’s youth was mobilised behind the Chairman’s call to ‘bombard the headquarters’, and eagerly took part in Mao’s revolt against his own party. The role of the young Red Guards caught not only China but the world’s attention. It seemed that they followed Mao not as a political leader, but rather as a god, ‘the reddest of red suns in all our hearts’. This chapter will examine the case for interpreting this phenomenon in terms of ‘political religion’. It will suggest that there is a strong case for arguing that the irrational and totalistic nature of the mass movement during the GPCR can be interpreted fruitfully as a secular theology. It urges caution, however, in using the term wholesale when considering the élite discourse which initiated the Cultural Revolution, and which did not seek actively to create a secular priesthood and religious community. It also suggests that the religious models most appropriate for comparison are not those of pre-modern China, but rather the European derived religious models which shaped Western political religions, and were well-known and understood by Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).