Knowing What to Do: On the Epistemology of Actions

Abstract

Do people know what they are doing? This admittedly simplistic phrasing conceals some questions of fundamental significance to a psychological theory of actions: Are human actions thoughtful and rational or are they often mindless and automatic? Are they consciously determined or do they frequently stem from unconscious forces inaccessible to human cognizance? In the present chapter we deal with some of the foregoing problems using as our frame of reference a theory of lay epistemology developed recently by Kruglanski and his colleagues (see, Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski, Baldwin, & Towson, in press; Kruglanski & Klar, 1982, Bar-Tal, Yarkin, & Bar-Tal, 1982). Our central thesis will be that voluntary actions by definition are based on intentions which essentially are types of knowledge about what it is that a person wishes to do. Thus, a general theory about the acquisition of all knowledge should be of help in elucidating how a particular knowledge is acquired, in this instance, the knowledge of one’s intentions.