Abstract
At CHES 2006, a DPA countermeasure based on the Fourier Transform was published. This generic countermeasure aims at protecting from DPA any S-box calculation used in symmetric cryptosystems implementations. In this paper, we show that this countermeasure has a flaw and that it can be broken by first order DPA. Moreover, we have successfully put into practice our attack on two different S-box implementations. Finally, we propose an improvement of the original countermeasure and we prove its security against first order DPA. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Coron, J. S., Giraud, C., Prouff, E., & Rivain, M. (2008). Attack and improvement of a secure S-box calculation based on the fourier transform. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5154 LNCS, pp. 1–14). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85053-3_1
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