Enterprise compensation incentive theory on principle-agent relation

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Abstract

This paper makes an analysis of the enterprise compensation incentive theories and documents their own advantages and shortcomings. From the perspective of principle-agent relationship, it put forward the opinion that tournament theory and behavior theory are suitable used in the relation between shareholders and managers, while piece-rate theory and time-rate theory are mainly applied in relation between managers and the front-line workers. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013.

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APA

Xie, H. B., & Chen, C. Y. (2013). Enterprise compensation incentive theory on principle-agent relation. In 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management: Engineering Economics Management (pp. 677–682). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_72

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