How collective intelligence emerge in complex environment?

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple adaptive model of competition called the Minority Game, which is used in analyzing competitive phenomena in markets. The Minority Game consists of many simple autonomous agents, and self-organization occurs as a result of simple behavior rules. Up to now, the dynamics of this game have been studied from various angles, but so far the focus has been on the macroscopic behavior of all the agents as a whole. We are interested in the mechanisms involved in collaborative behavior among multiple agents, so we focused our attention on the behavior of individual agents. In this paper, we suggest that the core elements responsible for forming self-organization are: (i) the rules place a good constraint each agent's behavior, and (ii) there is a rule that leads to indirect coordination. Moreover, we tried to solve the El Farol's bar problem based our suggestions. © Springer-Verlag 2004.