Rational inference strategies and the genesis of polarization and extremism

Abstract

Polarization and extremism are often viewed as the product of psychological biases or social influences, yet they still occur in the absence of any bias or irrational thinking. We show that individual decision-makers implementing optimal dynamic decision strategies will become polarized, forming extreme views relative to the true information in their environment by virtue of how they sample new information. Extreme evidence enables decision makers to stop considering new information, whereas weak or moderate evidence is unlikely to trigger a decision and is thus under-sampled. We show that this information polarization effect arises empirically across choice domains including politically-charged, affect-rich and affect-poor, and simple perceptual decisions. However, this effect can be disincentivized by asking participants to make a judgment about the difference between two options (estimation) rather than deciding. We experimentally test this intervention by manipulating participants’ inference goals (decision vs inference) in an information sampling task. We show that participants in the estimation condition collect more information, hold less extreme views, and are less polarized than those in the decision condition. Estimation goals therefore offer a theoretically-motivated intervention that could be used to alleviate polarization and extremism in situations where people traditionally intend to decide.