A note on the security of CSIDH

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Abstract

We propose a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between two elliptic curves E1,E2 defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(E i ) for i = 1,2. This concerns ordinary curves and supersingular curves defined over F p (the latter used in the recent CSIDH proposal). Our algorithm has heuristic asymptotic run time (Formula Presented) and requires polynomial quantum memory and (Formula Presented) quantumly accessible classical memory, where Δ is the discriminant of O. This asymptotic complexity outperforms all other available methods for computing isogenies. We also show that a variant of our method has asymptotic run time (Formula Presented) while requesting only polynomial memory (both quantum and classical).

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Biasse, J. F., Iezzi, A., & Jacobson, M. J. (2018). A note on the security of CSIDH. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11356 LNCS, pp. 153–168). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05378-9_9

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