This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its pitfalls.
CITATION STYLE
Perrine, T. (2018). Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(4), 979–996. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9938-y
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