A Real-Time Cache Side-Channel Attack Detection System on RISC-V Out-of-Order Processor

Abstract

Computer designers have included techniques such as speculative execution and caching to optimize speed and performance. Unfortunately, they could be exploited by the recently discovered cache-side channel attack, spectre. The purpose of this research is to resolve this problem on the open-source RISC-V architecture. Previously, software mitigation techniques and hardware modifications have been investigated on Intel or ARM system to address these issues. However, they are either difficult to implement or have resulted in a significant loss of performance. This work presents a real-time detection approach for cache side-channel attacks such as spectre on the RISC-V processor. By monitoring the CPU's cache activity with Hardware Performance Counters and analyzing the gathered data with a neural network, we extend previous researches in the field of cache side-channel identification. Since cache side-channels frequently result in a significantly altered cache usage pattern, the proposed multi-layer perceptron network can detect an attack event with an accuracy greater than 99% in our test environment with low performance overhead. This is the first time, to our knowledge, that a spectre attack on the RISC-V architecture has been detected in run-time via hardware events and machine learning.