Chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol secure against forgery

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Abstract

As a useful means of safeguarding privacy of communications, deniable authentication has received much attention. A Chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol is presented in this paper. The protocol has following properties. Any one of the two participants can't present a digital proof to convince a third party that a claimed agreement has really taken place. Once a forgery occurs, the original entity can present a digital proof to disclose the forgery. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.

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APA

Ma, C., Ao, J., & Li, J. (2007). Chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol secure against forgery. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4564 LNCS, pp. 124–133). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73257-0_14

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