Yeh et al. have recently proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard. They claim their protocol is secure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward secrecy. In this paper we show that the proposed protocol does not have cited security features properly. A powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol whereby the whole security of the protocol is broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al.'s protocol does not assure the untraceabilitiy and backwarduntraceabilitiy attributes. We also will propose our revision to safeguard the Yeh et al.'s protocol against cited attacks. © 2011 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
CITATION STYLE
Habibi, M. H., Alagheband, M. R., & Aref, M. R. (2011). Attacks on a lightweight mutual authentication protocol under EPC C-1 G-2 standard. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6633 LNCS, pp. 254–263). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_18
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