Abstract
In this paper we study public-key encryption schemes based on error-correcting codes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. In particular, we analyze a protocol due to Dowsley, Müller-Quade and Nascimento, based on a work of Rosen and Segev. The original formulation of the protocol contained some ambiguities and incongruences, which we point out and correct; moreover, the protocol deviates substantially from the work it is based on. We then present a construction which resembles more closely the original Rosen-Segev framework, and show how this can be instantiated with the McEliece scheme.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Persichetti, E. (2018). On the CCA2 security of McEliece in the standard model. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11192 LNCS, pp. 165–181). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_10
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