Beyond the Regulatory Gaze? Corporate Security, (In)Visibility, and the Modern State

Abstract

Alongside the growth of private security actors across the liberal democratic world has been the emergence of state regulation designed to align the operations of these actors with the public good. However, the coverage of state regulation is rarely complete, tightly controlling the operations of some actors while leaving others untouched. The main fault line in this uneven regulatory topography is the contract/corporate divide. State regulation always seeks to control the operations of contract security actors, yet often disregards their corporate counterparts (also referred to as in-house or proprietary security actors, depending upon jurisdiction).1 In Britain, for example, the state regulates contract security in seven sectors of the private security industry but regulates inhouse security in only two (White, 2013).2 In the US, there are no less than 33 states which regulate contract security firms but overlook those organisations providing their own proprietary security (Strom et al., 2010, s.6–2).3 In Australia, eight states regulate contract security guards but only two additionally regulate their in-house equivalents (Prenzler and Sarre, 1999: 10). Most starkly, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg all host regimes that regulate contract security actors but leave corporate security actors unregulated (Yoshida and Leishman, 2006: 227; Button, 2007: 122).