How to refer: Objective context vs. intentional context

Abstract

In "Demonstratives" Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by an act of demonstration, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context). Conversely in "Afterthoughts" Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a directing intention (a feature of the intentional context). I present the two theories in competition and try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic relevance. My claim is that the analysis of demonstrative reference provides a reliable test for our intuitions on the relation between objective and intentional context. I argue that the speaker's intentions can play a semantic role only if they satisfy an Availability Constraint: an intention must be made available or communicated to the addressee, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the objective context. This thesis implies the reconciliation between "Demonstratives" and "Afterthoughts".