Autonomy

Abstract

This chapter aims to present the second structuring element of practical life: autonomy, understood in terms of reciprocal recognition. I presented this way of conceiving autonomy in my book Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. I have developed this conception of autonomy in continuity with the works of Habermas, Apel and Honneth. Reciprocal recognition autonomy is conceptualized from the perspective of intersubjectivity, which assumes vulnerability and progressiveness in its acquisition, since in this process, the conditions that enable autonomous action can be affected by external or internal circumstances. This kind of autonomy emphasizes the processes of justification in which interpersonal or intrapersonal reasons are given for choosing a course of action. As with practical rationality and imagination, this kind of autonomy is also specifiable in different practical contexts in which there will be different requirements and justifying logics for its exercise.