Just Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al.(ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows' cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when re-using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Kuppusamy, L., Rangasamy, J., Stebila, D., Boyd, C., & Gonzalez Nieto, J. (2011). Towards a provably secure DoS-resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7107 LNCS, pp. 379–398). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_27
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