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Dynamic rent-seeking games

Games and Economic Behavior (1994) 7(3) 406-427
DOI: 10.1006/game.1994.1059
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Abstract

The present paper analyses rent-seeking games in which competitors for a rent can act and react finitely or infinitely often. It argues for an infinite-move model as the most appropriate specification of a model of rent-seeking. Dynamic equilibrium analysis of this game suggests that wasteful expenditures in rent-seeking competitions are lower than previously studied static (simultaneous-move) games predict. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, C73. © 1994 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

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Leininger, W., & Yang, C. L. (1994). Dynamic rent-seeking games. Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), 406–427. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1059

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