This article analyses the decmmissining framewrk fr il and gas infrastructures in Brazil, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tbag. It examines whether the existing prvisins in each cuntry are able t guarantee that the gvernment and, by extensin taxpayers, d nt bear the csts f decmmissining and, the cnsequences f inslvency n residual liabilities. An additinal mtivatin fr this examinatin is the nging Crnavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), a pandemic with significant adverse impacts n the il and gas industry. A likely cnsequence f the ecnmic devastatin frm this is the inslvency f any party with decmmissining bligatins. The article argues that the prvisins f the Brazil petrleum legislatin n the reversin f abandned installatins t the gvernment culd imply that taxpayers have t bear the residual liabilities withut any cmpensatin frm the cncerned cncessinaires r cntractrs. It als argues that the prvisins f the Petrleum Law t the effect that ‘the reversin f facilities des nt entail any expense whatsever fr the Brazilian gvernment ’des nt certainly translate t pecuniary cmpensatin t the latter fr assuming the future residual liabilities frm abandned installatins. The Nigerian and the Trinidad &Tbag Decmmissining Framewrk als suffer the latter risk f the gvernment bearing the residual liabilities fr such disused installatins. In Nigeria, the framewrk is silent n wh bears the residual liabilities fr disused installatins. Hwever, it is argued that the prvisins f the Prductin Sharing Cntracts n the transfer f wnership t the Nigerian gvernment implies that they wuld have t bear eventual liabilities fr such disused installatins. Even in cases where the licensee r cntractr may bear the burden f residual liabilities, the prblem f future inslvency and cessatin f such cmpanies may entail that taxpayers bear the burden f residual liabilities. The article cncludes with key recmmendatins n hw t address the identified gaps using lessns frm best practices such as United Kingdm, Nrway and United States f America. One f such prpsals is n the allcatin f liability where there is a transfer f interest. Anther is fr jint and several r at least secndary liability f respnsible parties even after decmmissining activities are ver; a recmmended prvisin t this effect is als prvided. The third recmmendatin is n hw time-cnstrained residual liability can be used alngside lump sum payments t limit the State's financial expsure fr decmmissining csts.
CITATION STYLE
Pereira, E. G., Taiwo, T. O., & Ole, N. C. (2020). Addressing Residual Liability and Insolvency in Disused Oil and Gas Infrastructure Left in Place: The Cases of Brazil, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago. Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 11(2), 326–361. https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v11i2.3
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