The Basic Problem

Abstract

Generality is arguably an essential feature of our experience of particular objects. Those who find this linguistic distinction between the general and the particular reflective of the ontological facts of the world identify these generalities as universals, and give them the status of mind-independent entities. The nominalist, on the other hand, argues that two things are similar by reason of each individual in itself, not because there is some common nature that is instantiated in both. As Nelson Goodman’s position is structured as an avoidance of what were to him intolerable alternative ontological commitments, this chapter places his nominalism within a historical perspective of twentieth century philosophy by showing Goodman’s relationship to Russell and to Quine. There are four strands of Russell’s thought that are pertinent to an examination of Goodman: Russell’s arguments against the British idealists, Russell’s theory of description, Russell’s referential theory of meaning, and Russell’s phenomenalism. Quine’s theory of reference, confirmation holism, and relativity are the essential links between him and Goodman. While Quine’s emphasis was on the linguistic analysis of language acquisition, Goodman’s was on the structural analysis of semantics. And for both, relativism was an essential part of that analysis as meanings were non-essentialist and constructed.