Designated verifier signature schemes: Attacks, new security notions and a new construction

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Abstract

We show that the signer can abuse the disavowal protocol in the Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo designated-verifier signature scheme. In addition, we identify a new security property-non-delegatability-that is essential for designated-verifier signatures, and show that several previously proposed designated-verifier schemes are delegatable. We give a rigorous formalisation of the security for designated-verifier signature schemes, and propose a new and efficient designated-verifier signature scheme that is provably unforgeable under a tight reduction to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the non-programmable random oracle model, and non-delegatable under a loose reduction in the programmable random oracle model. As a direct corollary, we also get a new efficient conventional signature scheme that is provably unforgeable under a tight reduction to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the non-programmable random oracle plus common reference string model. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.

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APA

Lipmaa, H., Wang, G., & Bao, F. (2005). Designated verifier signature schemes: Attacks, new security notions and a new construction. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3580, pp. 459–471). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_38

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