Between Nietzsche and Leibniz: Perspectivism and Irrationalism

Abstract

The image of Nietzsche as a proponent of irrationalism and an opponent of reason is widespread. Such interpretations usually attribute to him a significant influence on apparently major currents in twentieth century Western culture such as a loss of confidence in reason and rationality, a loss of confidence in the capacity for objectivity, the rejection of all absolutes, a loss of confidence in truth and the frequent acceptance of an all-embracing and undiscriminating relativism.1 To be sure, if Nietzsche was a contributor to a trend against reason and rationality, then he was not alone. Several powerful intellectual influences had already been moving against reason, from Hegel on throughout the nineteenth century and on, and even at best Nietzsche’s influence is unlikely to have been individually decisive. The enormously influential theories of Darwin, Marx, and Freud all imply that there are severe limitations to the place, scope, and power of human reason. Their influence on shaping limiting conceptions of human reason can hardly be doubted. But what makes Nietzsche special in this company is that his standpoint is more general and is not directly dependent on the vagaries of special theories in special areas. The real implications of Darwin, Marx, and Freud for human reason and rationality largely stand or fall with their domain-specific theories which, in the case of Marx and Freud, look more problematic as time passes. Nietzsche is not limited in this way. His standpoint has an importance and robustness that the others lack because of its generality and relative freedom from domain specific assumptions.