Coordination mechanisms for selfish routing over time on a tree

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Abstract

While selfish routing has been studied extensively, the problem of designing better coordination mechanisms for routing over time in general graphs has remained an open problem. In this paper, we focus on tree networks (single source multiple destinations) with the goal of minimizing (weighted) average sojourn time of jobs, and provide the first coordination mechanisms with provable price of anarchy for this problem. Interestingly, we achieve our price of anarchy results using simple and strongly local policies such as Shortest Job First and the Smith's Rule (also called HDF). In particular, for the case of unweighted jobs, we design a coordination mechanism with polylogarithmic price of anarchy. For weighted jobs, on the other hand, we show that price of anarchy is a function of the depth of the tree and accompany this result by a lower bound for the price of anarchy for the Smith Rule policy and other common strongly local scheduling policies. Our price of anarchy results also imply improved approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem of routing over a tree. This problem is well motivated from applications of routing in supercomputers and data center networks where average sojourn time is an important metric. © 2014 Springer-Verlag.

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APA

Bhattacharya, S., Kulkarni, J., & Mirrokni, V. (2014). Coordination mechanisms for selfish routing over time on a tree. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8572 LNCS, pp. 186–197). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43948-7_16

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