Der US-Supreme Court: Hüter der Verfassung oder Interpret der Gegenwart?

Abstract

Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze’s (1982) ultimatum game result is replicated with mean earnings of £59.98 (N = 51) S.D. = £11.45, from a possible £80, and a linear relationship between offer size and acceptance rate. Results indicate a significant interaction effect between offer size and response, F(3, 31) = 3.69, p < 0.05 on response time. Our novel adjustment introduced the proposer’s most ‘common offer’ to responders. Results were in accord with prior work (Knez & Camerer, 1995); social comparisons between the participant, and a hypothesised responder – the receiver of the ‘common offer’ – were made only at mid-range offers (£2), for which low common offers were accepted more from proposers making low common offers than high t(45) = 3.28, p< 0.05.