Sub-national governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Between transition and Europeanization

Abstract

The accession of eight Central and East European countries (CEECs) in May 2004 marked the beginning of a more direct and equal interaction between the political, economic and legal orders of the old and new Member States within the framework of EU policy-making. It also shifted the emphasis to the implementation and sustainability of the institutions, rules and norms adopted over the last decade. Thus, the post-enlargement context added a new impetus to the discussion about the successful transition and consolidation of states, democracy and market economies in CEE. While the post-enlargement dynamics have to remain speculation at this stage, there is a clear need for empirical research into the impact of the EU on the candidate states so far. Such research will be the basis for a better understanding of the relationship between the processes of transition and enlargement. By analyzing the EU's role in shaping sub-national governance in CEE, this chapter aims to make a step in this direction. The locale, the sub-national arena of regional and local politics is of key importance for the interrelated processes of post-communist transition and EU eastward enlargement. For political and economic changes to become consolidated, they have to become ingrained at all levels of governance. Likewise, EU enlargement and integration reach beyond national elites and institutions. They affect-and are affected by-sub-national actors and institutions. Four conditions frame the analysis of the trends of regionalization presented in this chapter. First, EU regional policy comprises one of the biggest incentive structures for the accession countries. The CEECs stand to benefit substantially from the EU's structural funds and regional and cohesion policy. The enlargement to the CEECs in 2004 have brought a sharp increase in budgetary subventions from the EU. The financial package agreed at the Copenhagen Council in December 2003 committed €40.8 billion to the ten new members in 2004-2006, over half of which amount (€21.7 billion) is to be spent on "structural actions." The new member states are also expected to be the main beneficiaries of regional funds in the next budgetary cycle 2007-2013. This incentive structure, underpinned by the power asymmetry characterizing the relationship between the EU and the CEECs, left a considerable scope for EU conditions, rules and norms to shape institutionbuilding, perceptions and practices in the transition countries. One could therefore expect a significant and detectable impact of the EU on sub-national governance in CEE as well as a degree of convergence in the institutional outcomes across the CEECs. Secondly, despite the prominent role of regional policy within the EU, the institutional environment at this level of governance is flexibly arranged. Regional governance is a sovereignty issue of the member states, and the EU's emphasis in regional policy is on process and outcome rather than on particular institutional models. Accordingly, the acquis is very "thin" on regional policy. The divergent models inside the EU and the absence of clear legal requisites counterbalances the latitude for EU influence in the candidate countries. We can hypothesize that the impact of the EU has been constrained by the lack of institutional detail tied to conditionality in this policy domain. Thirdly, the apparent thinness of the acquis in the field of regional policy contrasts with the centrality of this domain in EU policy-making and its budgetary implications. The lack of a complex set of explicit and codified institutional rules in the acquis and even the Structural Funds Regulations suggests a wider scope for implicit or "soft" conditions as well as individually tailored guidelines and pressure during the enlargement process. This setting increases the likelihood of inconsistency in the message communicated by Commission officials over time, resulting in weak institutional outcomes in the CEECs. Fourthly, the pre-accession negotiations have exhibited a "regional deficit" in that they have been confined to the Commission on the EU side and national elites from the executive structures in CEE.The lack of involvement of sub-national actors in the preparation for EU regional policy suggests a cross-national preference for minimalist and formal rule adoption, including a bias against politically empowered regions. Moreover, one could expect disengaged sub-national elites to be more Eurosceptic than the acculturated "Europeanized" national elites. © 2006 Springer.