It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is "majoritarian approving" i.e. it always picks "what's good for a majority" (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better "effective" half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency. © Springer-Verlag 1999.
CITATION STYLE
Sertel, M. R., & Yilmaz, B. (1999). The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable. Social Choice and Welfare, 16(4), 615–627. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050164
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