A significant effort has recently been made to rigorously relate the formal treatment of cryptography with the computational one. A first substantial step in this direction was taken by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02]. Considering a formal language that treats symmetric encryption, [AR02] show that an associated formal semantics is sound with respect to an associated computational semantics, under a particular, sufficient, condition on the computational encryption scheme. In this paper, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for completeness, tightly characterizing this aspect of the exposition. Our condition involves the ability to distinguish a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with, from a ciphertext and a random key. It is shown to be strictly weaker than a previously suggested condition for completeness (confusion-freedom of Micciancio and Warinschi [MW02]), and should be of independent interest. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2003.
CITATION STYLE
Horvitz, O., & Gligor, V. (2003). Weak key authenticity and the computational completeness of formal encryption. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2729, 530–547. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_31
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.