Abstract
This paper describes how a state emerges and collapses that makes it possible for citizens to do something which they will not do voluntarily. The model is a generalisation of the multi-stage game of Okada and Sakakibara (1991). The general model, its mathematical analysis with condition for simplicity and simulations for more general cases are presented. The results of simulations suggest that selfish but rational people may agree to make a state, which grows as the public capital stock accumulates but collapses when the stock reaches a certain level.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Iwasaki, A., Oda, S. H., & Ueda, K. (1999). Simulating a n-person multi-stage game for making a state. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1585, pp. 309–316). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_40
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