Modeling attacks on MANET using an incomplete repeated bayesian game

Abstract

Nowadays, individuals, as well as corporations, use the internet on a daily basis to send and receive emails, browse the internet, perform financial transactions, etc… However, this dependence comes with the huge risk of communicating over a network that has been compromised. Network administrators are constantly faced with new and improved security attacks that might result in significant losses. Only recently have game theoretic approaches found their way into the area of network security. In this paper we discuss the different types of security attacks while focusing on a general attack that resembles attacks on mobile ad hoc networks or MANETs. We model the attack as a Bayesian repetitive game with incomplete information between a malicious node and a normal node. We study the Nash equilibria of the game, and describe several punishment strategies. Finally, we show the results of our simulations where an equilibrium state is always reached and the average profit of normal nodes always significantly exceeds that of malicious nodes.