Deflationary truth and the problem of relativistic grounds of emotivism

Abstract

The article discusses the Frege-Geach problem, which is considered one of the most serious difficulties for emotive meta-ethics. The paper describes how recognition of an emotive content by moral statements in the form of attitudes leads to the emergence of the Frege-Geach problem. The essence of the problem is explained, which consists in the impossibility to make a logical conclusion in a situation of mixed contexts, when the antecedent has a value meaning, and the consequent is descriptive. The authors consider one way to solve this problem, which involves the use of a deflationary theory of truth. It is proved that the adoption of deflationism about the truth makes it possible to draw a logical conclusion in mixed contexts. They also raise the question of whether the application of deflationary truth concept is sufficient to avoid the relativistic effects of emotivism on normative ethics. The authors note that the synthesis of deflationism and emotivism is not able to explain the internalism of moral statements, which always have a hidden prescriptive modality. The conclusion is made that deflationism does not allow emotivism to avoid relativistic consequences in the field of normative ethics. Therefore, the authors conclude that emotivism should be called the nihilistic theory of the rationale for moral statements.