We study the problem of fairness design. Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. We present the first polynomial-communication envy-free profit-maximizing combinatorial auctions for general bidders. In this context, envy-free prices can be interpreted as anonymous non-discriminatory prices. Additionally, we study the canonical makespan-minimizing scheduling problem of unrelated machines, in an envy-free manner. For the special case of related machines model we show that tight algorithmic bounds can be achieved. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Mu’Alem, A. (2009). On multi-dimensional envy-free mechanisms. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5783 LNAI, pp. 120–131). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11
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