At CANS 2008, Mashatan and Stinson suggested a message recognition protocol for ad hoc pervasive networks. The protocol provides a procedure to resynchronize in case of a (possibly adversarial) disruption of communication. We show that this resynchronization process does not provide the functionality intended and in fact enables an adversary to create selective forgeries. The computational effort for the attack is negligible and allows the insertion of arbitrary messages. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
González Muñiz, M., & Steinwandt, R. (2010). Cryptanalysis of a message recognition protocol by Mashatan and Stinson. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5984 LNCS, pp. 362–373). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14423-3_24
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