Imagination, performativity, technics. A (Post)kantian approach

Abstract

In the present paper, I propose to rebuild and develop the concept of «Technical Schematism» presented by Kant (First introduction to the critique of the power of judgment. In: Guyer P, Wood A (eds) Critique of the pure reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000c) in the first Introduction to his Critique of the Power of Judgment [1790]. With this concept Kant designates a transcendental principle of a new type, endowed with a high epistemological interest. In fact, although it does not determine anything about nature, it sheds light on the analogical (or abductive) procedure by which the faculty of judgment organizes and extends the empirical experience. I will show, in particular, that the concept of «Technical Schematism» contains precious indications for: (i) consistently confront the issue of the performativity implied in the human praxis; (ii) profitably connect it with the issue of technics; (iii) open a promising perspective, in order to refer both performativity and technics to the cognitive (or denotative) function of language.