Abstract
In this chapter, I defend dual-aspect monism, and I examine it in detail. I claim that an ‘aspect’ is not a property, nor a higher-order property, and I show what role it plays in the understanding of the relationship between the mental and the physical. Close to Russellian monism, the variant of this view that I defend here claims that all entities are “phental”.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
APA
Benovsky, J. (2018). Dual-Aspect Monism. In SpringerBriefs in Philosophy (pp. 15–20). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9_3
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